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ABSTRACT
Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) enables users
to search encrypted messages by a specific keyword without com-
promising the original data security. Traditional PEKS schemes
allow users to search one keyword only instead of multiple key-
words. Therefore, these schemes may not be applied in practice.
Besides, some PEKS schemes are vulnerable to Keyword Guessing
Attack (KGA). This paper formally defines a concept of Trapdoor-
indistinguishable Secure Channel Free Public Key Encryption with
Multi-Keywords Search (tSCF-MPEKS) and then presents a con-
crete construction of tSCF-MPEKS. The proposed scheme solves
multiple keywords search problem and satisfies the properties of
Ciphertext Indistinguishability and Trapdoor Indistinguishability.
Its security is semantic security in the random oracle models un-
der Bilinear Diffle-Hellman (BDH) and 1-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Inversion (1-BDHI) assumptions so that it is able to resist KGA.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Cryptography; Public key (asym-
metric) techniques; Public key encryption;
KEYWORDS
Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS), Trapdoor-
indistinguishable, Keyword Guessing Attack (KGA), multiple key-
words search
1 INTRODUCTION
Computer has played a pivotal role in social civilization and progress
in the last several decades. Recently, computers have become more
prevalent in connecting people as well as producing substantial
benefits for society and enterprise. With the development of Inter-
net, companies and people are willing to store their data into the
third party (i.e. cloud servers) for saving local memory, reducing
expenses and extra backups. But, keeping data into the third party
may bring about some negative influences. The stored data may
start to bear the brunt of any attack. For instance, crackers are
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delighted in launching port scanning to exploit the vulnerability of
hosts and then intrude the victim’s system without authentication
and always ruin the operating systems in the end. Besides, some un-
friendly hackers may capture the data packages on the network and
then try to unpack these packages to obtain the information. Hack-
ing brings huge lost both in money and energy. Therefore, many
experts and technicians dedicate themselves to avoid these attacks
to some extent. It is noticeable that Public Key Encryption with
Keyword Search (PEKS) is one of the most advanced cryptographic
systems to ensure data transmission security.
Boneh et al.[4] proposed the first PEKS scheme in 2004, which al-
lows users to search encryptedmessages by a specific keywordwith-
out compromising the security of the primitive data. This scheme
is Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA)
secure but has its limitations. For instance, it requires a secure
channel between the server and the receiver, but building secure
channel is much expensive and unrealistic in some cases. Hence,
Baek et al.[1] came up with a new method to remove the secure
channel from the original PEKS scheme, namely “Secure Channel
Free Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (SCF-PEKS)”. In
reality, the keyword for searching is limited andmay suffer Keyword
Guessing Attack (KGA). Byun et al.[5] were first found that PEKS
was compromising from off-line KGA. Tang et al.[12] introduced
a new PEKS scheme resisting off-line KGA, but the encryption al-
gorithm is much complex. Later, Rhee et al.[11] pointed out that
KGA may break SCF-PEKS scheme. Therefore, they designed a new
SCF-PEKS scheme satisfying the property of Trapdoor Indistin-
guishability to prevent KGA. In 2013, Zhao et al.[15] proposed an
efficient Trapdoor-indistinguishable SCF-PEKS scheme, which has
better performance than Rhee et al’s scheme. The PEKS mecha-
nisms above tolerate “exact” keyword search instead of supporting
spell inconsistent (“common” and “comon”) or format error (“PhD”
and “Ph.D”), etc. Therefore, Li et al.[10] firstly introduced “Fuzzy
Keyword Search” concept into the encrypted model to solve these
problems. In 2013, Xu et al.[14] proposed a new PEKS with Fuzzy
Keyword Search to resist off-line KGA. Other typical PEKS schemes
are also proposed in recent years. Ibraimi et al.[9] proposed PEKS
with Delegated Search for detecting encryptedmalicious code. Chen
et al.[6] formalized Dual-Server PEKS to resist inherent insecurity in
2016. Meanwhile, He et al.[8] proposed a new PEKS scheme which
enables users to share contents and subscribe services in mobile
social networks. However, these PEKS schemes above specialize
in encrypting one keyword only rather than multiple keywords.
Baek et al.[1] presented a PEKS scheme to solve multiple keywords
search problem but it requires a secure channel to transmit Trap-
door. In 2016, Wang et al.[13] formally defined “Secure Channel
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Free Public Key Encryption with Multiple Keywords Search (SCF-
MPEKS)” to remove the secure channel. However, SCF-MPEKS may
suffer KGA, if the malicious server or receiver release its private
key to the public.
This paper formally defines Trapdoor-indistinguishable Secure
Channel Free Public Key Encryption with Multi-Keywords Search
(tSCF-MPEKS) model and then presents a construction of tSCF-
MPEKS and also proves its security under BDH and 1-BDHI as-
sumptions. The proposed scheme has the properties of Ciphertext
Indistinguishability and Trapdoor Indistinguishability which is able
to resist KGA and CPA.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 and GT be two cyclic groups (G1 denotes an additive group
andGT denotes a multiplicative group respectively).д is a generator
of G1 and a large prime number p is the order of G1. Let x and y
be the elements of Zp . A bilinear pairing can be regarded as a map
e : G1 ×G1 → GT : which has the following properties:
i. Bilinear: e(xM,yN ) = e(M,N )xy for allM,N ∈ G1 and x ,y ∈ Zp .
ii. Computable: e(M,N ) ∈ GT is computable in a polynomial time
algorithm, for anyM,N ∈ G1.
iii. Non-degenerate: e(M,N ) , 1.
2.2 The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
assumption[3]
Given P ,xP ,yP , zP as input (wherex ,y, z ∈ Zp ), compute e(P , P)xyz
∈ GT . An algorithm A has an advantage ε in solving BDH assump-
tion in G1, if Pr [A(P ,xP ,yP , zP) = e(P , P)xyz ] ≥ ε . It is considered
that BDH assumption holds in G1 if no t time algorithm has an
advantage at least ε in solving BDH assumption in G1.
2.3 The 1-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion
(1-BDHI) assumption[2]
Given P ,xP as input (where x ∈ Zp ), compute e(P , P) 1x . An algo-
rithm A has an advantage in solving 1-BDHI assumption inG1, if
Pr [A(P ,xP) = e(P , P) 1x ] ≥ ε . It is considered that 1-BDHI assump-
tion holds inG1 if no t time algorithm has an advantage at least ε
in solving 1-BDHI assumption in G1.
3 TRAPDOOR-INDISTINGUISHABLE SECURE
CHANNEL FREE PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
WITH MULTI-KEYWORDS SEARCH
3.1 Generic Model for tSCF-MPEKS
Sender, server and receiver are three participants in tSCF-MPEKS
model. More specially, sender is a party creating SCF-MPEKS en-
cryption while receiver is a party creating Trapdoor query. Both
the sender and the receiver transmit their encrypted messages to
the server. Then, the server runs Test algorithm to check whether
two encrypted messages have the same keyword. The details are
described as follows:
1. KeyGenParam (1n ): Input 1n and then produce a common param-
eter cp.
2. KeyGenServer (cp): Input cp and then produce a public and pri-
vate key pair (pkSer , skSer ) of the server.
3. KeyGenReceiver (cp): Input cp and then produce a public and
private key pair (pkRec , skRec ) of the receiver.
4. SCF − MPEKS(pkSer ,pkRec ,W ): Input the server’s public key
pkSer and the receiver’s public key pkRec , then generate a search-
able encryption S of a keyword-vectorW = (w1,w2, ...,wn ).
5. Trapdoor (pkSer , skRec ,w): Input the server’s public key pkSer
and the receiver’s private key skRec , then generate a trapdoor Tw
of a keywordw .
6. Test(skSer , S,Tw ): Input the server’s private key skSer , a search-
able encryption S=SCF −MPEKS(pkSer ,pkRec ,W ) and a trapdoor
Tw=Trapdoor (pkSer , skRec ,w). IfW includesw , output “yes”. Oth-
erwise, output “no”.
Figure 1: The structure of tSCF-MPEKS model
3.2 Secure Models for tSCF-MPEKS
As discussed in [1, 13], tSCF-MPEKS is IND-CPA and Trapdoor-
IND-CPA.
IND-CPA security is that the malicious server could not decide
which SCF-MPEKS ciphertext contains which encrypted keyword,
if it has not received the Trapdoor containing the given keyword.
Besides, if the malicious receiver that has not obtained the server’s
private key cannot check whether SCF-MPEKS ciphertext and Trap-
door have the same keyword, even if he/she intercepts all Trapdoors
for any keyword.
Trapdoor-IND-CPA security is that an outside attacker exclud-
ing the server and the receiver cannot differentiate any difference
between Trapdoors for two challenge keywords.
The IND-CPA and Trapdoor-IND-CPA for tSCF-MPEKS are for-
mally defined as the following: Let A be an attacker whose running
time is bounded by t and E be a challenger.
Game1: A is supposed to be a malicious server.
Setup: The challenger E initially runsKeyGenParam (1n ),KeyGe−
nServer (cp) andKeyGenReceiver (cp) to generate a common param-
eter cp, a public/private key pair (pkSer , skSer ) of the server and
tSCF-MPEKS SIN ’18, September 10–12, 2018, Cardiff, United Kingdom
a public/private key pair (pkRec , skRec ) of the receiver. Then, the
attacker A receives cp, pkSer , skSer and pkRec .
Phase 1-1 (Trapdoor queries):Adaptively, the attackerA can ask
E for any trapdoor Tw for any keywordw .
Challenge: A sends a target keyword-vector pair (W0, W1) on
which it wishes to be challenged by E, whereW0 = (w01, ....,w0n )
andW1 = (w11, ....,w1n ). Note thatW0 andW1 cannot be queried in
Phase 1-1. Once E receives the target keyword-vector pair, he/she
runs SCF −MPEKS algorithm to generate a searchable encryption
S=SCF − MPEKS(pkSer ,pkRec ,Wλ), where λ ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, E
sends S back to A .
Phase 1-2 (Trapdoor queries): A can continue to ask E for any
trapdoor Tw for any keyword w as in Phase 1-1, as long as w ,
w0,w1.
Guess: A outputs the guess λ∗ ∈ {0, 1} and winsGame1, if λ∗ = λ.
Game2: A is supposed to be a malicious receiver.
Setup: The challenger E initially runsKeyGenParam (1n ),KeyGe−
nServer (cp) andKeyGenReceiver (cp) to generate a common param-
eter cp, a public/private key pair (pkSer , skSer ) of the server and
a public/private key pair (pkRec , skRec ) of the receiver. Then, the
attacker A receives cp, pkRec , skRec and pkSer .
Challenge: A sends a target keyword-vector pair (W0, W1) on
which it wishes to be challenged by E, whereW0 = (w01, ....,w0n )
and W1 = (w11, ....,w1n ). Notice that Tw0i and Tw1i cannot be
queried in Test algorithm, where i = 1, ...,n. Once E receives the
target keyword-vector pair, he/she runs SCF −MPEKS algorithm to
generate a searchable encryption S=SCF−MPEKS(pkSer ,pkRec ,Wλ),
where λ ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, E sends S back to A.
Guess: A outputs the guess λ∗ ∈ {0, 1} and winsGame2, if λ∗ = λ.
The advantage of A wins Game1 and Game2 is as follows:
Adv I ND−CPAtSCF−MPEKS,Ai (k) = |Pr [λ∗ = λ] − 1/2|. (i = 1, 2)
Therefore, the tSCF-MPEKS model can be regarded as IND-CPA
secure only if the Adv I ND−CPAtSCF−MPEKS,Ai (k) is negligible.
Game3: A is supposed to be an outside attacker excluding the
server and the receiver.
Setup: The challenger E initially runsKeyGenParam (1n ),KeyGe−
nServer (cp) andKeyGenReceiver (cp) to generate a common param-
eter cp, a public/private key pair (pkSer , skSer ) of the server and
a public/private key pair (pkRec , skRec ) of the receiver. Then, the
attacker A receives cp, pkRec , pkSer while skRec , skSer cannot be
sent to A.
Phase 3-1 (Trapdoor queries):Adaptively, the attacker A can ask
E for any trapdoor Tw for any keywordw .
Challenge: A sends a target keyword pair (w0, w1) on which it
wishes to be challenged by E. It should be clear that none ofw0 and
w1 has been queried in Phase 3-1. Once E receives the target key-
word pair, he/she runs Trapdoor algorithm to generate a trapdoor
Tw=Trapdoor (pkSer , skRec ,wλ), where λ ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, E sends
Tw back to A.
Phase 3-2 (Trapdoor queries): A can continue to ask E for any
trapdoor Tw for any keyword w as in Phase 3-1, as long as w ,
w0,w1.
Guess: A outputs the guess λ∗ ∈ {0, 1} and winsGame3, if λ∗ = λ.
The advantage of A wins Game3 is as follows:
Adv
T rap−I ND−CPA
tSCF−MPEKS,A3 (k) = |Pr [λ∗ = λ] − 1/2|.
Therefore, the tSCF-MPEKS model can be regarded as Trapdoor-
IND-CPA secure only if the AdvT rap−I ND−CPAtSCF−MPEKS,A3 (k) is negligible.
4 PROPOSED tSCF-MPEKS SCHEME
4.1 The Construction of tSCF-MPEKS
1. KeyGenParam (k): Suppose G1 is an additive cyclic group and
GT is a multiplicative cyclic group. д is a random generator of G1
whose order is a prime number p ≥ 2k . A bilinear pairing is a map
e : G1 ×G1 → GT . Let H : {0, 1}◦ → G1 and H∗ : GT → {0, 1}•
be two specific hash functions. This algorithm returns a common
parameter cp = {д,p,G1,GT , e,H ,H∗}.
2. KeyGenServer (cp): The server randomly chooses a ∈ Zp and
then computes A = aP . Besides, the server also chooses B ∈ G1
uniformly at random. Therefore, the server’s public key is pkSer =
(cp,A,B) and the private key is skSer = (cp,a).
3. KeyGenReceiver (cp): The receiver randomly chooses c ∈ Zp
and then computes C = cP . Therefore, the receiver’s public key is
pkRec = (cp,C) and the private key is skRec = (cp, c).
4. SCF −MPEKS(pkSer ,pkRec ,W ): The sender randomly chooses
t ∈ Zp and then computes a searchable encryption S = (M,N1,N2, ..
.,Nn ) = (tA,H∗(D1),H∗(D2), ...,H∗(Dn )), whereD1 = e(H (w1),C)t ,
D2 = e(H (w2),C)t ,..., Dn = e(H (wn ),C)t .
5.Trapdoor (pkSer , skRec ,w∗): The receiver randomly chooses t∗ ∈
Zp and then computesTw = (T1,T2), whereT1 = cH (w∗)⊕e(A,B)t ∗+c
and T2 = e(A, t∗B).
6. Test(S,Tw , skSer ): For i ∈ {1, 2, ...,n}, the server initially calcu-
lates T = T1 ⊕ T2 • e(aB,C) = cH (w∗). Then, the server checks if
H∗[e(T , Ma )] = Ni . If so, output “yes”; if not, output “no”.
4.2 The Correctness of tSCF-MPEKS
AssumingW is a keyword-vector in SCF −MPEKS algorithm and
w∗ is a keyword in Trapdoor algorithm respectively. The scheme
is correct ifW includes w∗. The details are described below: For
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,n},
Firstly,
T = T1 ⊕ T2 • e(aB,C)
= cH (w∗) ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+c ⊕ e(A, t∗B) • e(aB, cP)
= cH (w∗) ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+c ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗ • e(A,B)c
= cH (w∗) ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+c ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+c
= cH (w∗)
Then,
H∗[e(T , M
a
)] = H∗[e(cH (w∗), tA
a
)]
= H∗[e(cH (w∗), tP)]
= H∗[e(H (w∗),C)t ]
= Ni
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4.3 The Security Analysis of tSCF-MPEKS
Theorem 4.1. The tSCF-MPEKS scheme above is IND-CPA secure
against CPA in Game1 under the random oracle model assuming
that BDH assumption is intractable.
Game1: A is supposed to be a malicious server.
Proof. Suppose that E has (д,p,G1,GT , e,xP ,yP , zP) as an input
of BDH assumption whose running time is bounded by T . E’s aim
is to calculate a BDH key e(P , P)xyz of xP , yP and zP using A’s
IND-CPA. Besides, suppose that A asks for at most h and h∗ hash
function queries.
Setup Simulation
E firstly sets C = xP and randomly selects a ∈ Zp and then cal-
culates A = aP . E also picks up B ∈ G1 uniformly at random.
Finally, E returns (д,p,G1,GT , e,H ,H∗) as the common parameter
cp, (cp,A,B) and (cp,a) as the server’s public/private keys and (cp,C)
as the receiver’s public key. Besides, E chooses two hash functions
H and H∗ as follows:
-A can query a keywordwi toH function at any time. To respond, E
searches H_List for a tuple (wi , Fi , fi ,θi ) and the H_List is empty
in original. If the sample exists, A will receive H (wi ) = Fi as a
response. Otherwise, E does the following steps:
i. E picks up a coin θi uniformly at random and then calculates
Pr [θi = 0] = 1h+1 .
ii. E selects fi ∈ Zp uniformly at random. If θi = 0, Ewill calculate
Fi = yP + fiP . If θi = 1, E will calculate Fi = fiP .
iii. E returns Fi as a response to A and adds (wi , Fi , fi ,θi ) into
H_List .
- A can query Di to H∗ function at any time. Then, E searches
H∗_List for a tuple (Di ,Ni ). If the sample exists, A will receive Ni
as a response. Otherwise, E selects Ni ∈ {0, 1}d uniformly at ran-
dom and then returns it to A and also adds (Di ,Ni ) into H∗_List .
Phase 1-1 Simulation (Trapdoor queries)
When A issues a query for the trapdoor corresponding to the word
wi . To respond, E executes the following steps:
- E runs the above algorithm for simulating H function to create a
tuple (wi , Fi , fi ,θi ). If θi = 0, E will stop and output “Suspension”.
Otherwise, E conducts the next step.
- E selects t∗ ∈ Zp and then computes T1 = fiC ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+x =
fixP ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+x = xFi ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+x = xH (wi ) ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+x and
T2 = e(A, t∗B). So, Tw=(T1,T2).
Challenge Simulation
A sendsW0=(w01,w02,...,w0n ) andW1=(w11,w12,...,w1n ) to E. Upon
receiving the target keyword-vector pair, E responds as follows:
- E randomly selects i ∈ {1, 2, ...,n}.
- E runs the above algorithms for simulating H function to obtain
two tuples (w∗0i , F ∗0i , f ∗0i ,θ∗0i ) and (w∗1i , F ∗1i , f ∗1i ,θ∗1i ). If θ∗0i and θ∗1i
are equal to 1, E will stop and output “Suspension”. Otherwise, E
conducts the next step.
i. E runs the above algorithms for simulating H function at 2(n − 1)
times to obtain two vectors of tuples ((w∗01, F ∗01, f ∗01,θ∗01), ..., (w∗0i−1,
F ∗0i−1, f
∗
0i−1,θ
∗
0i−1), (w∗0i+1, F ∗0i+1, f ∗0i+1,θ∗0i+1), ..., (w∗0n , F ∗0n , f ∗0n ,
θ∗0n )) and ((w∗11, F ∗11, f ∗11,θ∗11), ..., (w∗1i−1, F ∗1i−1, f ∗1i−1,θ∗1i−1), (w∗1i+1,
F ∗1i+1, f
∗
1i+1,θ
∗
1i+1), ..., (w∗1n , F ∗1n , f ∗1n ,θ∗1n )) . If θ∗0j and θ∗1j are equal
to 0 for all j = 0, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ...,n, E will stop and output “Sus-
pension”. Otherwise, E responds as follows:
– E randomly chooses β ∈ {0, 1}d .
– E randomly chooses Jj ∈ {0, 1}d and creates a target SCF −
MPEKS Ciphertext S∗ = (M∗,N ∗1 ,N ∗2 , ...,N ∗n ) = (zA, J1, J2, ..., Jn ))
So, S∗ = (M∗,N ∗1 , ...,N ∗i−1,N ∗i+1, ...,N ∗n ) = (zA,H∗[e(H (wβ1 ),C)z ], ..
.,H∗[e(H (wβi−1 ),C)z ],H∗[e(H (wβi+1),C)z ], ...,H∗[e(H (wβn ),C)z ])
Note that Jj = e(H (wβ i ),C)z = e(yP + fβ i P ,xP)z = e(yP ,xP)z •
e(fβ i P ,xP)z = e(P , P)xyz • e(zP ,xP)f β i
Note also that e(fβk P ,xP)z = e(fβk P ,C)z = e(H (wβk ),C)z
Phase 1-2 Simulation (Trapdoor queries)
A can continue to ask E for Trapdoor queries for the keywordwi .
E answers A as in Phase 1-1, as long aswi <W0,W1.
Guess
A outputs the guess β∗ ∈ {0, 1}. Then, E selects d in the list for H∗
function and returns
dβ∗i
e(zP,xP )fβ∗i
as the guess for BDH key.
Analysis of Game1
Three events are customized as follows:
Event1: E does not suspend during Phase 1-1 and Phase 1-2 (Trap-
door queries).
Event2: E does not suspend during Challenge Simulation.
Event3:A does not issue a query for either one ofH∗(e(H (w∗0i ),C)z )
or H∗(e(H (w∗1i ),C)z ).
Claim 1: Pr [Event1] ≥ 1e
Proof. Suppose that A does not issue the same keyword twice in
Trapdoor queries. So, the probability that a Trapdoor query causes
E for suspension is 1h+1 . Therefore, due to A asks for at most h
Trapdoor queries, the probability that E does not suspend in all is
at least (1 − 1h+1 )h ≥ 1e . □
Claim 2: Pr [Event2] ≥ ( 1h+1 ) • ( hh+1 )2(n−1)
Proof. If θ0 = θ1 = 1, E will suspend during Challenge Simulation.
So, the probability that E does not suspend is 1−(1− 1h+1 )2. Besides,
if θ∗0j and θ
∗
1j are equal to 0 for all j = 0, ..., i−1, i+1, ...,n, Ewill also
suspend here. Hence, the probability that E does not suspend during
Challenge Simulation is at least (1 − 1h+1 )2(n−1){1 − (1 − 1h+1 )2} ≥
( 1h+1 ) • ( hh+1 )2(n−1). □
Claim 3: Pr [Event3] ≥ 2ε
Proof. As discussed in [1], suppose Hybridr for r ∈ {1, 2, ...,n} is
an event that the attacker A can successfully guess the keyword of
the left part of a “hybrid” SCF −MPEKS Ciphertext formed with
r , coordinates fromwβ followed by (n − r ) coordinates fromw1−β .
Consequently, Pr [Event3] = 2Σnk=1(Pr [Hybridr ]−Pr [Hybridr−1]) =
2(Pr [Hybridr ] − Pr [Hybrid0]) = 2ε . □
Because the probability thatA issues a query for eitherH∗(e(H (w∗0i ),
C)z ) or H∗(e(H (w∗1i ),C)z ) is at least 2ε , the probability that A is-
sues a query for H∗(e(H (w∗ji ),C)z ) is at least ε . In total, E’s success
probability ε∗ is ( hh+1 )2(n−1) • εe(h+1)h∗ .
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Theorem 4.2. The tSCF-MPEKS scheme above is IND-CPA secure
against CPA in Game2 under the random oracle model assuming
that 1-BDHI assumption is intractable.
Game2: A is supposed to be a malicious receiver.
Proof. Suppose that E has (д,p,G1,GT , e,xP) as an input of 1-
BDHI assumption whose running time is bounded by T . E’s aim
is to calculate a 1-BDHI key e(P , P) 1x of xP using A’s IND-CPA.
Besides, suppose that A asks for at most h and h∗ hash function
queries.
Setup Simulation
E firstly sets A = xP and B ∈ G1. E also selects c ∈ Zp uniformly at
random and calculatesC = cP . Then,E returns (д,p,G1,GT , e,H ,H∗)
as the common parameter cp, (cp,A,B) as the server’s public key,
(cp,C) and (cp,c) as the receiver’s public/private keys. Besides, E
chooses two hash functions H and H∗ as follows:
– A can query a keywordwi to H function at any time. To respond,
E selects fi ∈ Zp uniformly at random and then calculates Fi = fiP
and finally returns Fi as a response to A.
– A can query Di to H∗ function at any time. Then, E searches
H∗_List for a tuple (Di ,Ni ). If the sample exists, A will receive Ni
as an answer. Otherwise, E selects Ni ∈ {0, 1}d uniformly at ran-
dom and then returns it to A and also adds (Di ,Ni ) into H∗_List .
Challenge Simulation
A sends (W ∗0i , F ∗0i , f ∗0i ,θ∗0i ) and (W ∗1i , F ∗1i , f ∗1i ,θ∗1i ) to E, whereW ∗0 =(w01,w02, ...,w0n ) andW ∗1 = (w11,w12, ...,w1n ).E randomly chooses
Jj ∈ {0, 1}d and β ∈ {0, 1}d . Then, E creates a target SCF −MPEKS
Ciphertext S∗ = (M∗,N ∗1 ,N ∗2 , ...,N ∗n ) = (ψxP , J1, J2, ..., Jn ).
So, S∗ = (M∗,N ∗1 ,N ∗2 , ...,N ∗n ) = (ψxP ,H∗(e(H (wβ1 ),C)ψ ),H∗(e(H (
wβ2 ),C)ψ ), ...,H∗(e(H (wβn ),C)ψ ))
Note that e(H (wβ ∗i ),C)ψ ) = e(fiP , cP)ψ = e(P , P)ψ ·fic .
Guess
A outputs the guess β∗ ∈ {0, 1}. Then, E selects d in the list for H∗
function and returnsψ = 1x ·fic as the guess for 1-BDHI key.
Analysis of Game2
Two events are customized as follows:
Event4: E does not suspend during Challenge Simulation.
Event5:A does not issue a query for either one ofH∗(e(H (w∗0i ),C)ψ )
or H∗(e(H (w∗1i ),C)ψ ).
Claim 4: Pr [Event4] = 1
Proof. There is no restriction to show that E will suspend during
Challenge Simulation. Therefore, it is easy to know that Pr [Event4] =
1. □
Claim 5: Pr [¬Event5] ≥ 2ε
Proof. When Event5 happens, it is known that the bit j ∈ {0, 1}
indicating whether the Ciphertext containsw0i orw1i is indepen-
dent of A’s view. Thus, the probability that A’s output j∗ satisfying
j = j∗ is at most 12 .
According to Bayes’s rule, Pr [j = j∗] = Pr [j = j∗ |Event5]Pr [Event5]+
Pr [j = j∗ |Event5]Pr [¬Event5] ≤ Pr [j = j∗ |Event5]Pr [Even5] +
Pr [¬Event5] = 12•Pr [Event5]+Pr [¬Event5] = 12+ 12•Pr [¬Event5]
According to the definition, it is clear that |Pr [j = j∗] − 12 | ≥ ε .
Then, ε ≤ Pr [j = j∗] − 12 ≤ 12 • Pr [¬Event5]. Consequently,
Pr [¬Event5] ≥ 2ε . □
Because the probability thatA issues a query for eitherH∗(e(H (w∗0i ),
C)ψ ) or H∗(e(H (w∗1i ),C)ψ ) is at least 2ε , the probability that A is-
sues a query for H∗(e(H (w∗ji ),C)ψ ) is at least ε . Due to A asks for
at most h∗ hash function queries, the probability that E selects the
correct answer is at least 1h∗ . In total,E’s success probability ε
∗ is εh∗ .
Theorem 4.3. The tSCF-MPEKS scheme above is Trapdoor-IND-CPA
secure against CPA in Game3 under the random oracle model assum-
ing that BDH assumption is intractable.
Game3: A is supposed to be an outside attacker excluding the server
and the receiver.
Proof. Suppose that E has (д,p,G1,GT , e,xP ,yP , zP) as an input
of BDH assumption whose running time is bounded by T . E’s aim
is to calculate a BDH key e(P , P)xyz of xP , yP and zP using A’s
IND-CPA. Besides, suppose that A asks for at most h and h∗ hash
function queries.
Setup Simulation
E firstly setsA = xP , B = yP andC = zP and then returns (cp,A,B)
as the server’s public key and (cp,C) as the receiver’s public key. E
also randomly chooses two H and H∗ hash functions at random.
Phase 3-1 Simulation (Trapdoor queries)
When A issues a query for the trapdoor corresponding to the word
wi . To respond, E chooses t∗ ∈ Zp uniformly at random and then
computes T1 = zH (wi ) ⊕ e(yP ,xP)t ∗+z and T2 = e(t∗yP ,xP). So,
Tw=(T1,T2). Finally, E returns Tw to A.
Challenge Simulation
A sends (w∗0 ,w∗1) to E. E creates the challenge Trapdoor as follows:
E randomly selects a bit β ∈ {0, 1}d . Therefore, T1 = zH (wβ ∗ ) ⊕
e(yP ,xP)t ∗+z = zH (wβ ∗ )⊕e(P , P)xyz•e(P , P)xyt ∗ andT2 = e(t∗yP ,
xP).
Phase 3-2 Simulation (Trapdoor queries)
A can continue to ask E for Trapdoor queries for the keywordwi .
E answers A as in Phase 3-1, as long aswi , w0,w1.
Guess
A outputs the guess β∗ ∈ {0, 1}. If β = β∗, E outputs “yes”. Other-
wise, E outputs “no”.
Analysis of Game3
Due to A is a malicious outside attacker, he/she cannot distin-
guish any difference between two Trapdoors even though these
two Trapdoors have the same keyword. The reason is that E ran-
domly chooses t∗ ∈ Zp and t∗ changes every time leading to
T1 = cH (wi ) ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+c changes every time. Even if two Trap-
doors have the same keyword, the results are still different because
of t∗. Therefore, the key part of Trapdoor Indistinguishability in
tSCF-MPEKS is the confidentiality of e(A,B)t ∗+c .
Suppose that the attackerA obtains the value of e(A,B)t ∗+c , he/she
can distinguish whether two Trapdoors have the same keyword.
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The reason is that the attacker A only calculates one extra XOR
operation as T1 = cH (wi ) ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+c ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+c = cH (wi ).
Therefore, the attack A can distinguish that Tw0 = cH (w0) and
Tw1 = cH (w1) are equal as long asw0 = w1. According to Challenge
Simulation in Game3, it is known that e(A,B)t ∗+c = e(P , P)xyz •
e(P , P)xyt ∗ , which satisfies BDH assumption. Consequently, the
attacker A cannot calculate the value of e(A,B)t ∗+c and therefore,
he/she cannot compute T1 = cH (wi ) ⊕ e(A,B)t ∗+c .
5 COMPARISON AND PERFORMANCE
This section presents a comparison of security between the pro-
posed scheme (tSCF-MPEKS) and another two typical schemes
(MPEKS[1] and SCF-MPEKS[13]). In addition, the performance of
the proposed scheme is also described in this part.
Table 1: Comparison of security assumption and properties
Scheme CT Ind Trap Ind SC KGA
MPEKS Satisfied Not satisfied Required Vulnerable to KGA
SCF-MPEKS Satisfied Not satisfied Not required Vulnerable to KGA
Proposed scheme Satisfied Satisfied Not required Not vulnerable to KGA
CT Ind, Trap Ind, SC and KGA are the abbreviation of Ciphertext
Indistinguishability, Trapdoor Indistinguishability, Secure Channel
and Keyword Guessing Attack respectively.
The proposed scheme is simulated using type A pairing in JPBC
Library[7]. The conditions of the simulation platform is illustrated
in Table 2 and the time cost is shown in Table 3. However, the
proposed scheme removes the secure channel so that the trapdoor
can be transmitted via the public networks. Also, the proposed
scheme satisfies Ciphertext Indistinguishability and Trapdoor In-
distinguishability which is able to resist KGA. Overall, the proposed
scheme has better performance than Baek et al’s MPEKS[1] and
Wang et al’s SCF-MPEKS[13] schemes.
Table 2: Simulation Platform
OS macOS Sierra 10.12.5
CPU 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7
Memory 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3
Hard disk 512GB
Programming language JAVA
Table 3: Performance by 1000 times computer simulation (n=3)
tSCF-MPEKS KeyGen_Ser KeyGen_Rec SCF-MPEKS Trapdoor Test
Average time 0.017s 0.012s 0.088s 0.045s 0.019s
6 CONCLUSION
This paper revisits MPEKS and SCF-MPEKS schemes and then de-
fines the model of Trapdoor-indistinguishable Secure Channel Free
Public Key Encryption with Multi-Keywords Search (tSCF-MPEKS)
and also presents a concrete scheme. The proposed scheme solves
multiple keywords search problem and incorporates the advan-
tages of removing secure channel so that it is a practical and cost-
saving system. By comparison of security between the tSCF-MPEKS
scheme and the others, the proposed scheme satisfying Trapdoor
Indistinguishability is much secure and can prevent KGA. In addi-
tion, the proposed scheme is efficient and has high performance by
1000 times computer simulation.
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